PLAN outnumbering the US Navy

The Chinese navy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy or PLAN, is planning to have 351 ships in active service by 2020. If these numbers are true then the PLAN will outnumber the US Navy. At the moment the US Navy lists 288 ships as deployable, however this number is not correct as it does not include ships under construction or maintenance.

The correct number of US Navy ships in service is open to debate. As a result of budget cuts the US Navy found new ways to count the amount of ships it has in order to preserve it funding. The total US Navy strengths is somewhere around the lower half of 300 ships, depending on what sources and calculation a person takes.

Regardless of the exact number of ships the US Navy has in its inventory, it is indeed in trouble of being outnumbered by the PLAN. The PLAN budget keeps rising every year while that of the US Navy has been decreasing over the past years. China also builds more ships every year then the US Navy can. Stating that the PLAN will outnumber the US Navy by 2020 is becoming more a certainty then a possibility. But even with the US Navy outnumbered the question remains if the US Navy will be out powered by 2020.

US Navy task Force: cruisers and destroyers form the screen of an aircraft carrier

Although the PLAN might have a quantitative superiority over the US Navy in 2020 it will not yet have a qualitative superiority. The PLAN still lags behind in the technological gap that exists between both navies. This gap however might be closed faster than anticipated. China has been taking big steps forward in technology these past years, albeit aided by stealing technology from the United States by cyberattacks. Still, as Chinese weapons and systems become more advanced its navy will start posing a bigger threat.

One must also take in account the major imbalance between the PLAN and the US Navy. The US Navy is a blue water navy for combat on the open ocean and is centered around aircraft carriers, cruisers and nuclear submarines. The PLAN is a green water navy designed to operate between the Chinese mainland and the First Island Chain. The PLAN mainly employs frigate sized warships and diesel-electric submarines. These ships pack a lesser punch in terms of amount of weapons compared to their US Navy counterparts. Although China is trying to build larger destroyers and even cruiser sized warships in an attempt to create a blue water navy task force.

As part of being a blue water navy the US Navy prefers to use carrier aviation to fight its naval battles. With 11 aircraft carriers in service the US Navy vastly out powers the PLAN in this field. The PLAN only has one aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, that can carry only half the amount of aircraft of a US Navy Nimitz class aircraft carrier. More dramatic is the fact that the carrier wing of the Liaoning will only be fully ready for service in 2016. China plans to build 3 more aircraft carriers and it remains unsure if these new aircraft carriers will be of the same design as the Liaoning or if China makes the transition to a nuclear powered aircraft carrier with catapults.

PLAN task forces: frigates are the main units in the PLAN compared to destroyers in the US Navy

 
The PLAN is however working to close this gap in capabilities. The PLAN currently focus heavily on building air defence frigates and destroyers. The new 052D type destroyer is currently the most advanced air defence destroyer in the PLAN. It is not even sure if the PLAN wishes to develop the same capabilities as the US Navy. The PLAN has always put a great emphasize on missile technology then on carrier aviation. It is possible that the PLAN wishes to use an asymmetric naval warfare in which it overwhelms US Navy ships with massive missile attacks and that carriers will only serve to give local air protection for PLAN warships.

The biggest imbalance in technology and numbers are found in submarines. The PLAN has more submarines then the US Navy has. Unlike the US Navy nuclear submarines, the PLAN uses diesel-electric submarines. These submarines are more quite then their US counterparts and harder to detect. They lack however range and speed to patrol large areas, even with air independent propulsion. Still, the PLAN knows how to build modern submarines and with luck and skillful positioning these submarines can be deployed in ambushes against US Navy task forces. In the past PLAN submarines already succeeded in surfacing inside a US carrier task force and simulate an attack.

The PLAN is working to modernize its nuclear submarine forces. New submarine designs are being made but no real construction has begun. Even these new nuclear submarine types will still be outdated compared to the modern US Navy nuclear submarines but they will still be a vast improvement over the PLANs current nuclear submarines.

Even with the US outnumbered against China, the US Navy still has allies that can fill in the missing numbers. Both South-Korea, Japan and Australia have modern navies and are working close with the US Navy. China on the other hand can only count on allies like North Korea and Russia. The former being an unreliable partner with a small and outdated navy, the later lacking any significant numbers at the moment.

Conclusion

The PLAN is planning to outnumber the US Navy by 2020. Given its higher budget increases and faster ship building capability this news doesn’t come as a surprise. Even outnumbers the US Navy can still contain the PLAN as it is a technological more advanced navy. The PLAN is however working hard in closing the technological gap, sometimes even aided by technology theft through cyberattacks.

The PLAN is also a green water navy, operating smaller ships with lesser weapon systems on them as compared to the US Navy which is a blue water navy operating larger warships. China will counter this by developing a missile centric approach instead of a focus on carrier aviation, a field in which China will continue to lag behind the US Navy for the next decades.

Chinese submarines are less advanced then the US nuclear submarines but they are modern, hard to detect and capable of suppressing US task forces.  China will continue to develop its submarines, even its outdated nuclear submarine forces in an effort to close the technologic gap.

Even outnumbered the US Navy can still count on several allies with modern navies whom are capable to contain the PLAN within the first island chain. China however lacks such allies.

The major implications of the cancellation of the F-35 for the US and Royal Navy

The F-35 is one of the most debated weapon program ever in the United States armed forces. Enormous cost overruns, multiple failures and a delivery time that keeps being pushed further into the future are the big problems that trouble the F-35 program. With each failure the demand to cancel the F-35 program is getting louder. Still, the US armed forces are dedicated to go ahead with the F-35 program and keep on pushing it to make sure that the F-35 enters service. A cancellation of the F-35 program would not only will leave the US Air Force without a fifth generation aircraft to confront its adversaries, especially Russia and China whom are developing their own fifth generation aircraft, but it would also have an impact on the US and Royal Navy and US Marine Corps (USMC).

In the future, the USMC is planning to operate  from new amphibian warships of the America-class. Part of their air wing on these ships will consist of short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft. The aircraft in mind is the F-35B and this makes sense. With the Asian Pivot of the Obama administration the US Navy and USMC are taking a more prominent role in the Pacific. This means that their main adversary will be China. To stay ahead of China’s military rise and modernization, the US have a reel need in a fifth generation aircraft that can outperform the new Chinese aircraft.

F-35 practicing landing on board of the USS Wasp

Delays in the F-35 program are working against the USMC. The longer it takes for the F-35, the more difficult it becomesfor the US to guarantee a superiority in aircraft before China develops its own new generation aircraft with equal or even superior performance as the F-35.

The delays in the F-35 have already caused a major tactical disadvantage for both the USMC and the US Navy who want to operate the aircraft. Designed to be a stealth plane, its prolonged development and testing phases have caused it to run behind the latest developments. The new Russian and Chinese radar systems are reported to be capable to detect and track the F-35. At the same time the F-35 lacks the equipment to jam enemy radars.

The USMC managed to purchase Harrier aircraft from the Royal Navy in order to equip their forces on board of the amphibian carriers of the US Navy. Expecting further delays in the F-35 program, these Harriers were modernized and are expected to last until 2030 although many doubt if this date can be met. The USMC is in favor for the F-35 program and keeps supporting it as it has no alternative aircraft available that can operate from amphibian carriers once the Harrier aircraft have to be taken out of service. Failure and cancellation of the F-35 would leave the USMC without an aircraft that can be used to support its troops on the ground until a new aircraft is developed and tested, a lengthy process that can take several years. The development of the F-35 started in 1996 and after almost 20 years it still isn’t produced in the mass numbers that are needed. Developing a new aircraft is expected to take at least a decade and can go up to two decades if the testing phase is prolonged.

The situation is less critical for the US Navy. Although the US Navy has stated that it would like the F-35C variant to operate as the principal carrier aircraft it still  has several other options available should the F-35 program be canceled. The most reasonable option for the US Navy is to continue to use the F-18 Super Hornet as the principle carrier fighter aircraft until a new aircraft design can enter service.

Unlike the US, which still has options available, the Royal Navy has no backup plans. The F-35 is envisioned to be the aircraft deployed from the new British carriers of the Queen Elizabeth class. The first aircraft carrier, the HMS Queen Elizabeth will be commissioned in the 2016/2017 timeframe but it won’t be until 2020 when the Royal Navy is expecting to have the F-35. This means that the Royal Navy will have to make do for 3 years without an aircraft stationed on its carrier. It can also no longer fall back on Harrier jets as those have been sold to the USMC. A cancellation of the F-35 program would mean that the Royal Navy will have 2 aircraft carriers in 2020 but no aircraft that can operate from them. The Royal Navy can not fall back on other types of carrier aircraft since its carriers are using sky ramps. Only Russia and China currently have planes that can take off from a ski ramp but it is very unlikely that the United Kingdom will buy fighters from these countries.

F-35 mock up for the christening ceremony of the HMS Queen elizabeth

Conclusion

The F-35 program is known to be extremely costly with a price tag that keeps rising every year, it is prone to many failures that grounded the existing fleet on several occasions and it has taken so long to develop that it is no longer the superior aircraft it was envisioned to be in the beginning of its development. Setbacks and budget overruns have already caused strong opposition from both the US government and the US military itself as whether the F-35 is the aircraft the US armed forces still need.

The program, however, is too far into its development to be canceled overnight and even if the F-35 program is canceled it will have grave implications for the US Navy and US Marine Corps. Although the US Navy have the luxury to keep on using the F-18 Super Hornet in the next years and decade until a new aircraft design is developed, the situation for the USMC and the Royal Navy is worse.

If the F-35 program is canceled the USMC can only depend on its aging fleet of Harrier aircraft and these are too few in numbers to support all the USMC operations. Although modernized to be kept in service until 2030 many doubt if that date can be met.

The Royal Navy however has no other alternative and a cancellation of the F-35 program will leave the Royal Navy without planes to place on its new aircraft carriers.

Countering China by rebalancing the US 7th Fleet

The US 7^th fleet is currently stationed in Japan and is the only US fleet to have a forward deployed aircraft carrier, the USS George Washington. In light of the current geopolitical situation in Asia, the US 7^th Fleets main rival is the People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of China. As the PLAN’s main focus is the East and South China Sea, the US 7^th Fleet finds itself in a difficult position to respond rapidly in times of a crisis.

The First Island Chain an Near Sea Strategy

The First Island Chain is a line that runs from Japan, along Taiwan and the Philippines to the South China Sea. In American strategy the First Island Chain is a defensive barrier to contain the PLAN. Within this chain there are only a few places where a Chinese fleet can pass in order to reach the open ocean and to challenge US naval power directly. Although this makes sense from the view of a containment strategy, China has a different interpretation of this.

First Island Chain marked in red

China also sees the First Island Chain as a barrier. Beyond that barrier lies the US naval power but China views the area between its coast and the First Island Chain as its own. Indeed, while US thinking in the past was only aimed at containment and focused on the First Island Chain itself it never addressed the issues of the seas between the Chinese coast and the First Island Chain. This allowed China to form its own strategy, the Near Sea Strategy.

Under the Near Sea Strategy the Chinese view the South China and East China Seas as its own. The Chinese believe that the US have given them a free hand to do what they want in these seas as the US is only focused on the areas outside of the First Island Chain. As China gains more economic and military power, it also gains the political assertiveness to start claiming territories. The proclamation of an air defense zone over the East China Sea as well as claiming disputed islands both in the East China Sea as in the South China Sea are examples of China’s growing political assertiveness.

Shortcomings in US Strategy

The main problem for any US strategy to deter Chinese attempts to claim areas like the Spratly islands or even Taiwan is that it is currently in a difficult position. At the moment the US 7^th Fleet is stationed at Yokosuka, Japan. This is close enough to the East China Sea and Taiwan but is too far away to respond rapidly to crisis’s in the South China Sea. At the moment, the South China Sea seems to be the area that would be of main concern to China and where the PLAN is being deployed.

China claims almost all of the South China Sea, aggravating its neighboring countries. The tensions are especially high between China on the one side and Vietnam and the Philippines on the other side. Both Vietnam and the Philippines lack the naval forces to confront the PLAN.

At the same time the navies of South Korea and Japan have been expanding and modernizing and their capabilities have been improving over the past years. As a result of that both countries have the capability to deter the PLAN in the East China Sea.

Stability in the South China Sea is paramount for global trade but the imbalance in forces, in favor of China, allow China to do what it wants. A larger US Navy presence in this area could be a stabilizing factor. The US 7^th Fleet however continues to focus on the East China Sea given that both the naval bases of Dailan and Shanghai are located at this sea.

Repositioning to the south

With South Korea and Japan both capable of deterring the PLAN in the East China Sea and with growing tensions in the South China Sea a more balanced position of the US 7^th Fleet seems to be needed. A more central position in the First Island Chain would be an answer as it would bring the US 7^th Fleet closer to the South China Sea to respond quickly as well as being able to send ships to the East China Sea.

Of all the positions the Philippines would be the best position to station US naval forces. It allows the US Navy rapid deployment in the South China Sea and is still relative close to Taiwan, an ally the US obliged to defend.

The US also have long lasting relations with the Philippines and had many military bases in the country from where it ran its Asian-Pacific operations. Only in the beginning of the 1990s were US troops ordered to leave by the Philippine government. Not that US troops were unpopular but a lack of an external threat in that time saw no justification of having US troops in the country. However, during the 1990s and 2000s the Philippines did ask for US military aid in combating radical Muslim groups in the southern Philippines. With a rising China claiming vast parts of the South China Sea and Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), it can be expected that the Philippines might be asking for a larger US naval presence in their EEZ. The reopening of US bases would ensure a US naval presence in favor of the Philippines while at the same time allow the US Navy to react faster to Chinese actions in the South China Sea.

The US is already looking to have bases in the Philippines. The former naval base in Subic Bay is just one of those bases that the US government would like to use. Already, several US submarines have docked in Subic Bay to replenish their supplies in the past months. The current agreement however only allows warships to enter the Subic Bay with approval of the Philippine government, instead of unlimited access. The facilities in Subic Bay also have to be renewed and improved in order to sustain a large US naval presence.

At the same time an airbase in the Philippines would the US Navy to deploy maritime surveillance aircraft over the South China Sea to monitor the situation if needed.

US Naval base at Subic Bay before the 1991 closure

Although a repositioning of the US Navy in the Philippines would be beneficial for both countries, it still hasn’t been materialized. Although both countries signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, aimed at increasing U.S. troops’ rotational presence in the Philippines, there still aren’t any major US naval bases in the Philippines. One would expect the Philippines to be a more demanding party for US backing against a more assertive China. Maybe on the other hand, the Philippines want to keep US backing to a minimum as not to provoke China to much.

There is a certainty in light of the Asian Pivot of the Obama administration and the military weak position of the Philippines against China that the Philippines will end up demanding a bigger and more permanent US military presence in their country.

If the US 7^th Fleet makes a shift towards the Philippines to be in a better position to stabilize the situation in the South China Sea. Knowing that Japan and South Korea are reliable partners with big modern navies to deter the PLAN if needed, the US can with comfort relinquish most of its tasks in the East China Sea to these two countries and start focusing mostly on the South China Sea.

The Littorial Combat Ship – does a failed ship means a failed program?

The Littorial Combat Ship (LCS) was supposed to be the United States Navy answer to naval warfare in the 21th century. The LCS was supposed to be a ship capable of operating in the littoral waters around the world, reaching places the bigger US Navy warships weren’t capable of reaching. It is designed to be a versatile craft, capable of completing several different tasks. The most innovative thing about the LCS is that it comes with several different mission modules, allowing the ship to be optimal equipped for a specific task. Whenever the mission changed, the ship would only have to switch its mission module to be ready for a new task. Switching the module would only take several hours; maybe a day at most as it was envisioned.

The program however was plagued by several setbacks that in the end cast its own doom. The ship was built to be capable of every mission it was expected to do and so the US Navy ended up with an all-round ship that in the end turned out to be too weak to survive full combat .

The ship

Already at the beginning of the LCS program it became clear that it was structurally unsound. Coming out of the Cold War the demand for building warships decreased and many shipyards now find themselves without orders. In the LCS program both Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics were in the running. Lockheed Martin proposed the Freedom class while General Dynamics proposed the Independence class. As the US government couldn’t decide it allowed both designs to be built with each company building up to 25 ships. It is still unclear why the US government made this radical decision but given the fact that two major companies were involved and the difficult situation in US shipyards, one can assume that a lot of lobbying over which design was to be chosen might have been involved. This allowed the US Navy to break with tradition. The US Navy always focused on having one design for each type of ship. Oliver Hazard Perry’s formed the backbone of modern frigates, Arleigh Burkes for destroyers, Ticonderoga’s for cruisers and Nimitz class for carriers. By replacing the Oliver Hazard Perry’s with 2 new classes of warships the US Navy made it’s logistical supply system a bit more complicated as it is now forced to keep 2 sets of different spare parts to supply the 2 different classes of LCS ships instead of one set for one type of ship.

A USS Independence class follewed by a USS Freedom class

The second problem was the fact that construction cost increased over the years. Once again there are no clear details why but this seems to be an universal problem throughout the world. In order to get contracts shipyards make a low estimate of the costs which always turn out to be too low once the building process starts. An interesting example of this is the Russian-Indian deal to modernize the former aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov for the Indian Navy. It makes sense that both shipyards increased costs in order to make as high as possible a profit once they saw the original order of 50 ships split in half between both designs.

Budget overruns caused the US government to stop approving the construction of more ships. This already signaled a possible end for the LCS program. The US Navy however kept pushing for the LCS program as both its Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates and its minesweepers were getting too old to be kept in service. A replacement was badly needed and only the LCS program was available. Starting all over would cause a delay of several years.

The LCS program faced another setback when studies revealed that the LCS is incapable of fighting a conventional surface warfare. The LCS is too ill-equipped as a frigate. Its 57mm gun is a step backwards compared to the 76mm guns normally installed on frigates. It also lacks the protection to defend itself against anti-ship missiles installed on other frigates. Its survival category is rated just below that of the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates it is meant to replace. This meant that for operations in the Western Pacific against the Chinese and North Korean Navies, the LCS was not capable of performing as needed and would become an easy victim in a confrontation.

The LCS seemed however to be a good ship to combat asymmetric threats such as fast attack crafts and mine warfare. The LCS would therefore be perfect for operations in the Persian Gulf where the biggest threat are Iran’s fast attack craft and threats of mining the Strait of Hormuz. Likewise it would perform well in anti-piracy operations.

The final nail in the coffin of the LCS program came on February 24^th, 2014 when Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed the US Navy to come up with alternative proposals for a new surface combatant the size of a frigate. Hagel was more focused on the evolution of geopolitical affairs in the Western Pacific and the role that is required from the US Navy, notably the US 7^th Fleet, in this region. As stated early, a LCS didn’t fit in that theater. At the same time the total amount of LCS to be built dropped from 50 to 32. Unless the LCS can prove that it can carry enough firepower and protection to operate and survive against more advanced warships, notably in the Chinese navy, then the project seems to stop right there.

The program

The strength of the LCS was its capability to adapt itself to new missions. This was done by installing modules on board of the ship that could be changed in port when the mission changed. Several different modules allow the ship to perform counter mine, anti-submarine and surface warfare. A specialized crew, trained for a specific mission, would be transferred on board together with its new module.

Unlike most military ships who can only excel in one or two tasks, the LCS was capable of performing a large set of tasks at a high level of efficiency. It was capable of adopting very fast to a changing environment of threats. This is what made the LCS so revolutionary. When for instance the threat changes from anti-submarine warfare to counter mine warfare most navies will require to replace their anti-submarine warship, being either a frigate or destroyer, and bring in a mine hunter. All a LCS had to do was go to the nearest friendly port, change its modules and be back in the warzone in a minimum of time. The cost of changing the module compared to bringing over a new warship in the warzone was envisioned to be lower. We must stress the word envisioned as the LCS program so far never faced this situation and no hard data is available to prove this concept.

Lay out of a USS Independence class

Still, the concept of a modular ship is revolutionary and has an enormous impact on smaller navies. Having one platform, capable of performing a wide set of tasks all depending on the change of modules, would allow smaller navies to play bigger roles. Instead of buying several types of warships, each one specialized in one task, one platform would be needed. This would decrease procurement costs in smaller navies allowing them to allocate more money for operations. At the same time there can be a reduction in crew. Take for instance the hypothetical situation in which a country has 8 mine hunters and wants to play a more assertive role on the high seas and start protection its trade routes. This is a mission more suited for a frigate. Instead of selling some mine hunters and buy new frigates and retrain a whole crew a simple change in module could decrease the cost. No new ships have to be build or bought. Most of the crew can remain like navigation and technical personnel as ship characteristics and heavy machinery haven’t changed. Only the crew attached to the modules need to be changed.

All this would give smaller navies  the ability to participate in missions that would otherwise be outside the scope of their capabilities. In a rapidly changing world one can see that naval threats can change easily and fast, ranging from the Iranian threat of mining the Strait of Hormuz, to the threat of the Chinese submarine fleet and piracy in both East and West Africa and drug smuggling in the Caribbean. Modular ships offer the possibility to confront all of these problems with only one platform.

There is however a huge financial pitfall in modular ships. The by far most important factor that make naval ships so expensive is technology. When you want the latest technology installed on your ship, you are going to pay a very high price. The concept of a modular ship currently only exists in the LCS program and therefor the only modules that are being developed are those for the LCS. This gives a country little options if it wants to acquire modular ships and its modules. This technology is still in its infancy and development costs will be passed on to the consumer. The failure of the LCS program also put an end to the development of modular ships and unless it gets continued by another big navy that will pay for the development then this technology will be out of reach for several smaller navies at this moment and in the near future.

LCS modules designed to fit in containers to facilitate transport

One must also take into account the extra modules and their operating crews. Changing the modules on a ship can obviously only work if an extra stock of different modules is available along with trained crews.  Although envisioned to be less expensive than a seperate ship that would normally be required, the extra modules and their crews will still have to be payed for, even when they remain on standby until they can be deployed on board of a ship.

Conclusions

The LCS program is deemed to be a failure but only because of a faulty platform. When the US Navy looked for a replacement of both its minesweepers and frigates the LCS program seemed to be the answer. The use of modular systems to change the capabilities of a ship were revolutionary and would be more economical then having several types of warships .

Several problems in the LCS caused its downfall. Starting from an indecision of the US government to select one design. Both Lockheed as General Dynamics let the building costs of the LCS rise in order to gain a profit. At the same time the LCS was both in size and primary armament a mix of a frigate and a minesweeper. As such, it was a platform incapable of keeping up with the missions that were expected of a frigate. It was underpowered in armament and its survivability lay lower than a frigate.  This itself seemed no problem as long as the US Navy was focused on the Middle East but the Asian Pivot meant that the US Navy mean adversary was the Chinese Navy (PLAN). The PLAN ships are modern and carry a lot of firepower. As such an LCS wasn’t capable of confronting the PLAN and the need for a fully capable frigate was issued by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on February 24^th, 2014.

Although LCS program is cancelled, its principal idea of a modular ship is appealing for smaller navies seeking to expand their capabilities at the lowest cost as possible. For them, the concept of a modular ship is not only vital but it is essential as smaller navies don’t have the budgets to build or buying the several ships needed to confront the several naval. More often than not smaller navies need to prioritize and specialize on one task only while relying on other navies to cover the other aspects of naval warfare that they themselves aren’t capable of fulfilling.

The LCS program of the US Navy has been a failure. Unfortunally its main concept, a modular ship that can adapt to changing maritime threats, is doomed to be labeled a failure as well. Many maritime thinkers think of a modular ship only as  the LCS program and because the LCS is a failure, for those persons the modular ship concept is labeled a failure as well.

Still, the concept of a modular ship has never been put into question and is essential for smaller navies as it would allow them to take a bigger role on the high seas that were before impossible for them to fulfill. Modular ship design and development might have been halted for now but the concept is so revolutionary that it will reemerge in a couple of years. If the modular ship concept is placed on a decent platform then the failure of the LCS program won’t be for nothing .