In this new series on The Naval Report, we will be examining some of the
most important naval battles in history. Strategy and tactics will be discussed
and analyzed and important lessons for present day naval warfare will be put
forward.
This post will not give the whole history of the battle, for that we
refer to Wikipedia and all the books written in the past 72 years about Midway.
We will focus just on the important phases during the battle that made a
significant contribution.
Much has been said about the Battle of Midway. US navy officers
sometimes like to pretend that there was a brilliant strategy to catch and
destroy the Japanese carriers by surprise. The truth is, it all came down to
window of opportunity of only 5 to 10 minutes in which sheer luck decided the
outcome. In the 72 years after the battle, the US Naval War College still
replays the battle in wargames but has never been able to create a US victory.
So how did the Japanese manage to lose the battle? Several events played contributed
and had they played out different, the US victory would never have happened.
The planning
When Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto decided to attack Midway to lure
the remaining American carriers and destroy them, his plan was needlessly
complex. It called for a first attack on the Aleutian islands the lure the US
carriers north. To make the Aleutian attack credible, he sent the light
carriers Junyo and Ryujo north to pretend the main Japanese
carrier forces were located over there. Its main carrier force was comprised the 4 big
carriers while the invasion fleet had the light carrier Zuiho. The light carrier Hosho
was part of a fourth naval task force.
·
Admiral
Yamamoto already failed to apply a very old doctrine that says to never split
your forces against an undefeated enemy. But then again, Japanese intelligence
told him that the US Navy had only 2 carriers left in the Pacific, Enterprise and Hornet. They thought that the Yorktown
had been sunk. Japan felt confident that it had a 2 to 4 advantage in main
carriers but it reality it had only a 3 to 4 advantage
·
The plan
was also needlessly complex. A dividing strike against the Aleutians made no
sense if the plan was to destroy the last US carriers.
·
Also
splitting the his forces meant that the carrier force under Admiral Nagumo had
to both attack Midway and prepare for battle against US carriers. He was told
that the US carriers would only appear after 3 days. This was a wrong
assessment. Nagumo would arrive before
the invasion fleet with his 4 carriers and would have to fulfill 2 tasks. Had
the fleet stayed together then the light carriers and the battleships could
have assaulted Midway and the 4 main carriers of Admiral Nagumo could have
focused on the job of finding and destroying the US carriers.
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| 3 june, Air attacks on Dutch Harbor Alaska. Part of the plan to draw US carriers away from Midway |
Opening moves
As the Japanese carrier force arrived near Midway it started the task of
attacking the island with airplanes believing they had a 3 day window before
the US carriers would arrive. At this point the Japanese were unaware that the
US Navy had broken their codes and had sent 3 carriers towards Midway. These
carriers were waiting northeast of Midway. Standard procedures of the Japanese
were to send scout planes to build a maritime picture around their carrier
force. Overconfident of their 3 day window, the Japanese launched only 7 planes
on a one phase search instead of a double phased search. 2 search planes took
of late because of engine troubles. These two planes had to search a sector in
which US carriers were located.
The first airstrike at Midway was not sufficient to silence all the
defenses. As Japan was certain of a quick victory, they refused to bomb the
airstrips because they wanted to use them themselves for the upcoming battle
against the US carriers. This allowed the US to keep sending planes from Midway
to attack the Japanese carriers. A second strike was needed and this meant
rearming the planes, a time consuming process.
·
Japan did
come up with a new code, but by the time it was implemented several days before
the Battle of Midway, the US Naval Intelligence already had all the details of
the plan.
·
Japanese
overconfidence already started to set things in motion that would lead to their
defeat. Not taking out the airstrip on Midway and not enough planes created the
need for a second strike. Things would have been different had light carriers
and battleships arrived at Midway on June 4. This would free Nagumo to focus on
finding the US carriers while cruisers and battleships shell Midway’s defenses.
·
Overconfidence
let them to neglect their own
procedures. A single phase search instead of a double phase is ordered. Instead
of two aircraft patrolling a certain sector, only one is assigned. Two aircraft
fail to take off in time, and as it would happen, their sectors contain the
area where the US carriers are stationed for their attacks.
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| planes taking off from Midway |
The battle phase
US attacks were uncoordinated at best. Midway and the US carriers never
contacted each other to try and let their planes arrive together above the
Japanese carriers. Even between the 3 carriers there was no coordination in
strikes. Nobody took the opportunity of launching a full strike taking in
account the different speeds of the different aircraft or their tactics as dive
bombers attack from high above while torpedo planes attack from just above the
waves. The US admirals decided to throw
as many planes as possible, as fast as possible against the Japanese carriers.
Right after the first Japanese attack wave returned, Admiral Nagumo
received a message from one of his delayed search planes. It had located the US
carrier force and now Nagumo had to rearm its planes with armored piercing
bombs and torpedo’s to strike against the carriers instead of a second strike
at Midway.
·
Although
this is not the way to execute an airstrike, it did produce several results.
One, it kept the Japanese planes busy. Wave after incoming wave of US aircraft
forced the Japanese to stay on the defensive and not launching their own
strike. It also meant that Japanese fighter aircraft were starting to run low
on ammunition and fuel and had to land on the carriers while new fighter
aircraft had to be launched to maintain the protection of the Japanese
carriers.
·
Even when
there was a break in the US attacks, the Japanese were still rearming their
planes. The Japanese were unable to launch an airstrike on the US carriers.
 |
| Torpedo planes standing ready on the USS Enterprise |
Window of opportunity
The last US aircraft that had a chance of attacking the Japanese
carriers before they could launch an all-out airstrike were 2 squadrons of dive
bombers from the USS Enterprise. They
had arrived at a wrong location but somehow spotted the Japanese destroyer Arashi that was left behind to sink the
submarine USS Nautilus. After her
failed attack on Nautilus, the Arashi was steaming back to the Japanese
carriers. The US dive bombers followed the Arashi
and found the Japanse carriers. They arrived at the crucial moment. Fighter
aircraft were being rearmed and refueled and those in the air were still at a
low altitude after attacking a previous wave of US torpedo planes. The hangar
decks of the Japanese carriers were filled with bombs and torpedo’s. The
Japanese carriers were at their most vulnerable moment and the US dive bombers
had no opposition.
·
Delays and
uncoordinated attacks left the Japanese vulnerable at a crucial moment. Only by
sheer luck did the US dive bombers arrive at the right time. Had they arrived
several minutes earlier or later, they would have faced more Japanese aircraft
against them and their chances of destroying 3 Japanese carriers were lost.
·
The
Japanese already felt the pressure of having too few aircraft all morning. Not
capable of knocking Midways defenses out or at least damaging its airstrip they
were caught between striking land targets or attacking US carriers. They hadn’t
the numbers of doing both simultaneous.
·
Had
Admiral Yamamoto kept his carriers together things would have been different.
Even with the light carriers only concentrated on the fighter protection of the
main Japanese carriers, Admiral Nagumo had been capable of getting his aircraft
in the air to strike back against the US carriers.
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| Soryu, Akagi and Kaga burning after the US dive bombing attack |
The end phase
Destroying 3 Japanese carriers changed the balance. From a 3 to 4
advantage, the Japanese fell to a 1 to 3 disadvantage. Although they would
damage and later sink the USS Yorktown,
they lost their fourth carrier later in the day. With only 2 main carriers left
in Japan for repairs and 4 light carriers, Japans fate was sealed. It could
never hope to destroy the US Pacific Fleet carriers and keep the US Navy on the
defensive.
·
Already at
a disadvantage, the Japanese still tried to attack the US carriers. Although
their aircraft were better and their pilots were more experienced, they couldn’t
hope to overcome their disadvantage in numbers. Had the Japanese decided to
call it a day, they might have been able to spare one main carrier and several
veteran pilots for future battles.
 |
| USS Yorktown under arial attack by aircraft of the carrier Hiryu |
Conclusions
·
Never divide forces against an undefeated
opponent. The Japanese made a very complex battle plan
that ended up with their carrier forces split. They thought they had a 2 to 4
advantage but in reality they had only a 3 to 4 advantage. The lack of aircraft
doomed the Japanese carriers as the 4 main carriers could only perform a single
task, either attack Midway or attack the US carriers. The time it took to
switch ammunition placed the Japanese at a vulnerable moment when the last US
attack with dive bombers came.
·
Focus on the objective. The Japanese carriers didn’t have to attack
Midway. Their cruisers and battleships could have easily done that had they
arrived off Midway on the same day. The job of the Japanese carriers was to
fight the US carriers, instead they wasted precious time in a first strike on
Midway.
·
Intelligence. The US Navy knew the composition and order of battle of the Japanese
Navy and didn’t fall in the trap of the Aleutian attack. Instead it positioned
its carriers north of Midway ready for a counterattack as soon as possible. The
Japanese didn’t know anything of the US order of battle and had to work with
assumptions. They thought they had a 3 day period before the US carriers
arrived but failed to reason that the US carriers might arrive earlier.
·
Never change essential procedures. The single phase search instead of a double
phase search meant that the Japanese were unaware of the US carrier forces
until their planes were rearming for a second strike on Midway. Had they
spotted the US carriers earlier then the Japanese would have had the capability
to launch a first strike against the US carriers as half of their planes were put
on ready for this mission while the first strike on Midway was underway. An
early Japanese strike might have led to a US defeat.
·
Confusion is good but it still needs mistakes
of the enemy to be a battlewinner. Perhaps the most important lesson of this battle. The uncoordinated US
airstrikes left the Japanese confused and prevented them in the end from
maintaining a decent air defense. In the end, their aircraft were still too low
to engage the US dive bombers that sank 3 out of 4 Japanese carriers.
·
Luck can change even the best plans. If it wasn’t for the lonely destroyer Arashi heading back to the Japanese
carriers, there was little chance that the US dive bombers would have been
capable of finding the Japanese carriers in time before the Japanese fighter
aircraft had restored a defensive screen above the Japanese carriers.
 |
| Soryu avoiding bombs droppend by B-17 bombers in the morning of June 4 |
Closing remarks
The Battle of Midway wasn’t a battle that determined the outcome of the
war in the Pacific. The US industrial might made sure that it could outmatch
the Japanese Navy and that the US could replace its losses faster than the
Japanese could. What made Midway so important is that it had a profound impact
on the length of the war in the Pacific. Had the Japanese won, it would have
taken the US more time to build a fleet big enough to go back on the offensive
and the opposition of Japan would have been tougher as it could then count on
the 4 carriers not lost at Midway.
Indeed, the US managed to attack Guadalcanal in August 1942 only because
its naval balance of power was equal in carriers at that time. Even then,
several months of bloody naval battles were needed to ensure US naval dominance
in the Pacific. A US Pacific Fleet without carriers would not have gone to the
offensive at Guadalcanal and this would have had an impact on the US-Australian
convoy route that was vital to get US troops and supplies to the southern
Pacific.
Replacing their loses at Midway would have focused the US more on the
Pacific than on Europe as the Japanese would become a bigger threat to US
security. More ships and troops would have been sent to the Pacific to defend
and stop the Japanese. These troops would be missed in Europe and it is
uncertain if Operation Torch, the US and British landings in North Africa in
November 1942 would have even happened.
The war in the Pacific would have lasted longer with a US defeat. Some
experts claim the ultimate victory would have been in 1947, 2 years later then
it was. These 2 years coincide with the US Navy building program of new
carriers, the Essex class with the
first carriers commissioned in December 1942, the others in 1943 and 1944. A
stronger Japanese navy with more main carriers and light carriers would have
been a tougher enemy and it would have taken longer to defeat them decisively.
With a prolonged war in the Pacific and less forces sent to the European
front, what would the future of Europe have been? Would Operation Overlord have
had the same magnitude or would it have been further postponed until enough
ships, transport craft and men became available from the US? Would this free
German forces to fight and slow down the Red Army on the eastern front? And if
so, would Europe have witnessed the first atomic bomb being dropped on Berlin?
The Battle of Midway is a story of flawed planning and luck. Without
those two factors, of which luck cannot be put under human control, the course
of World War Two would have been changed beyond measure. By all means, June 4,
1942 should have been a Japanese day of victory. Even with flawed planning, an
indecisive leader in the form of admiral Nagumo, a lack of intelligence and not
having one clear objective, the Japanese still held all the cards. They had
better planes, tactics and their pilots were unmatched in experience.
Perhaps the most important lesson one can learn from the Battle of
Midway is that naval commanders must always be prepared for unexpected events.
This being even more true when confronted with difficulties such as a flawed
positioning of forces, a lack of means to complete several tasks and a lack of
intelligence on what enemy forces are out there. Admiral Nagumo’s indecision in
the face of these setbacks also cost him the day. Had he acted more resolute
and focused on its main task, finding and sinking US carriers, he would never
had ordered a second strike on Midway, knowing that other ships could finish
the job. He then would have had to await the arrival of the US carriers and use
his advantage in numbers and experience. Instead, he became an unlucky man.
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