Update on Russia's naval program

The Russian Navy has set for itself a very ambitious plan to rebuild its naval forces and become once again a decent blue water navy. The only problem is that Russia has these plans a lot and even after 15 years it still finds itself without a decent navy. Hampered by a weak economy, several priorities, expensive technology, a lack of knowledge and a decent maritime defence industry it will be hard for Russia to change the tide in the next years.

As we stated earlier, Russia aims for the 2050 deadline to have its new fleet but it faces a large gap in the next years. As the life expectancy of its soviet build warships are ending it seems that Russia must find the means to rebuild its naval forces to bridge the 2020-2050 gap or face the prospect of several years without a blue water navy to rely on.

Modernisation of older ships

Russia has problems with keeping enough large surface combatants active. It indeed had to resort to modernizing decommissioned Kirov class cruisers to maintain a decent force of large warships afloat. More problematic is the situation in the Russian submarine forces. Depending on the numbers and analysis it is estimated that between 40 to 70% of all nuclear submarines in the Russian Navy are not operational. Since most of these ships were outdated models that were left over from the Soviet Union it is debatable if they possess any real combat power.

Russia had plans to modernize its submarine fleet by 2020 but delays were encountered in the construction of the Borei-class SSBN and the Yasen-class SSN. These delays were mostly financial in reason. Still, these delays mean that by 2020 Russia will not have its full complement of modern submarines and thus will have to rely longer on it soviet submarines. A new plan has recently emerged to modernise up to 10 nuclear submarines of the Akula- and Oscar II-class. This modernisation plan will extend their lifespan with 15 to 20 years making their projected end-life last between 2030 and 2035. Modernizing 10 submarines is aimed to counter the gap created by the slow construction of the Yasen-class SSN as only three to four submarines out of the projected eight will be ready in 2020.

Indeed, Russia’s naval program is very ambitious and even neglects its economic and technologic deficiencies. It is estimated that between 50 and 70% of the weapons and equipment envisioned for 2020 will not be ready. This forces Russia to keep modernizing its already aging and worn out fleet of Soviet era ships to keep its Navy up to strength.

Impossible carrier ambitions?

Russia has always stated that it wants aircraft carrier. The exact amount was always debatable, depending on the defence budgets. A fair assessment would be that Russia wants to operate 4 to 6 aircraft carrier by 2050, spread equally between the Northern and Pacific Fleets.

A couple months ago a design of a new Russian aircraft carrier was unveiled in Saint Petersburg. Nuclear powered, carrying 100 aircraft and with a ski ramp and catapults, the ship was unlike anything seen so far. This was just an early design and there can happen a lot between the first scale model and the carrier that will eventually be build. We must however focus on how realistic a 100.000 ton carrier is for Russia.

During the Soviet Union it was the shipyard “Nikolayev 444” in Ukraine that built the aircraft carriers. Russia no longer has access to this shipyard with the brake up of the Soviet Union. Even if it had the Nikolayev 444 shipyard it would still not be enough as even that shipyard wasn’t built to construct 100.000 ton aircraft carriers. Indeed, no shipyard in Russia can build such an aircraft carrier. The only possibility would be to build it in two segments and weld them together in the deep water basin at Sevmash in northern Russia. But a better option would be the construction of a new large dry dock but this goes beyond Russia’s current defence budget. Russia also never had experience in building this type of aircraft carrier and there is doubt if she could do it on her own. An earlier deal with France regarding the purchase of the Mistral class ships was also aimed in bringing modern shipbuilding technology to Russia. China seems a likely partner as the country has ambitions to build its own nuclear powered aircraft carrier. Still, even if Russia would find the skills and means to build an aircraft carrier it would take 10 to 15 years before they get it operational.

Own developments

Russia isn’t incapable of building warships and it has experience, just not in building large warships. Russia’s newest generation of corvettes and frigates are of a good quality but they serve only as a green water navy and lack the means to project power globally.

Russia does have the ambitions to build its navy and new projects are beginning to take shape that air aimed to build larger surface combatants. A new class of destroyers, the “Leader” class is currently on the drawing board. Destroyers will be the backbone of any blue water navy and Russia will need them in combination of its carrier ambitions.

Russia’s new aircraft carrier is designed to project power, unlike the previous carriers that were only designed to protect the own task force. A power projecting aircraft carrier lacks the means to protect itself, in spite of its large arsenal of aircraft. This is why aircraft carriers always travel with an escort, usually made up by destroyers armed with a lot of missiles. If Russia wants to project power globally and is serious in its carrier program then it will need a substantial amount of destroyers in its arsenal.

Russia also hasn’t given up on the Mistral-class. Plans are under way to build a copy of the Mistral-class in Russia. The construction of a Russian version will most likely be taken place in the Baltic shipyards according to the latest media statements. Once again the deadline of 2020 is envisioned. Once again it should be noted that Russia lacks the expertise to build these warships on their own but this doesn’t deter them. It is possible they manage to build some variant on the Mistral-class but the question will remain how good the vessel will be. Still, Russia needs to learn how to build large surface combatants and has to start somewhere.

Outside pressure

Reality starts to face the Russian Navy. Most of its current fleet is old and nearing the end of its surface life. The current ship building plans are aimed at 2020. It is estimated that by then most of the Soviet era warships are no longer functional. A full recovery for the Russian Navy still remains for 2050.

Can Russia afford itself to scale back its ambitious shipbuilding program and invest first in its defence industry? The answer is no. Russia feels the need to stay involved in the world and the best thing to do that is by having the tools to project power. The 21ste century will most likely be a maritime one and Russia can not afford itself to be left over with a fleet of corvettes, frigates and diesel-electric submarines that are most suited for coastal defence. It needs powerful warships capable of operating a long way from home.

Already Russia is feeling the pressure of outside nations. China and the United States are building up their naval forces in the Pacific. Russia already feels the need to strengthen its fleet in the Pacific in order to maintain its influence or faces the prospect to be bypassed by smaller nations like Japan and South-Korea.

Likewise it needs to be able to defend the Black Sea and maintain its naval presence in the Mediterranean. A smaller Russian navy can not be active everywhere.

Conclusion

The Russian navy finds itself at the cross roads. It needs to have a decent navy, capable of operating globally and compete with other naval powers. There are however lots of doubts if Russia can make it. The plans for 2020 are very ambitious and might even fall short. This will be true in the field of nuclear submarines. The Yasen-class SSN will only consist of four boats by 2020 instead of eight fully operational in the planning. This means Russia needs to fall back on its Soviet-era submarines but their combat power and relevance remains questionable.

In the field of surface warships Russia needs to learn how to build ships bigger than a frigate. The “Leader” class destroyer and a Russian version of the Mistral are good initiatives to learn how to build large warships. This experience will be needed once Russia starts building nuclear powered aircraft carriers but without a decent dockyard the whole carrier program seems difficult and troublesome to realize.

A new destroyer for Russia

Russia keeps modernising its naval forces in order to create a blue water navy that is capable of challenging the US Navy on the high seas. In an earlier report we mentioned the bad state of the Russian surface fleet. Most of its surface combatants that form its blue water navy are very old and will probably retire within a decade. Frantic efforts to modernise old Kirov battlecruisers can be seen as a last effort to preserve Russia’s influence on the world’s oceans.

Over the past two decades Russia has been working to preserve her naval strength and several new warships have joined the Russian navy. Most of these surface warships however were all corvettes and frigates more aimed to protect Russia’s coastline and to form a green water navy capable of operating around 200 nautical miles out of the shoreline. Indeed, what Russia has been missing over the past years were large surface warships that can form a blue water navy. Central in a blue water navy are destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers.

 

Model of the presumed Leader-class destroyers

The construction of new destroyers has been debated many times in the Russian media. There are many dates and programs being put forward over Russia’s new destroyers just as it is the case with the Russian plans for building a new aircraft carrier. Things are however moving as Russian leaders become aware that a new class of ocean going destroyers is needed in order to project power around the world. A new destroyers class, called the Leader-class, is currently being developed.

Details about the construction of the Leader-class are vague and sometimes confusion but here is what we already know about this class. First it should be noted that the Leader-class destroyers are still in development. During 2015 the final design of the new destroyer should be finalized by the Northern Design Bureau, the creator of practically all of the major surface warships in the Russian fleet.

Construction of the new destroyer itself is not planned until 2020 at the earliest. Funding of the new Leader-class destroyer will probably arrive after 2020 and will be linked on a bigger shipbuilding program aimed to rebuild a massive Russian Navy by 2050.

The construction of the first vessels should happen in the 2023-2025 timeframe. As such these new destroyers will serve as an intermediate model to bridge the next 25 years until the new Russian blue water is finally ready.

The Leader-class will replace the old Project 956 Sovremennyy-class destroyers as well as the Project 1155 Udaloy-class anti-submarine destroyers. So far only twelve destroyers are reported to be build. Six will be commissioned in the Northern Fleet, with the other six commissioned in the Pacific Fleet. In earlier reports the Russian Navy did spoke however of 14 to 16 destroyers to be build.

 

Computer representation of the Leader-class

The Leader-class will also be a multi-purpose destroyer. The main weapons on board of these destroyers will be Caliber integrated missile system which is exported under the name “Klub” and includes 3M-14 anti-ship and cruise missiles. These missiles are designed for the destruction of targets at great distances.

It is also possible that the destroyer will also carry the P-800 Onyx anti-ship supersonic cruise missiles. Also probably a main weapon system on board the Leader-class will be the S-500 anti-aircraft system, specially redesigned to be used on board of warships.

 

Alternate design of the Leader-class that is believed to be
the nuclear powered variant

The most interesting fact to follow up will be the propulsion system on board of these destroyers. Two designs are being developed, one with a normal gas turbine and one with a nuclear power plant used for propulsion. Of all the Russian surface warships, only the Russian cruisers of the Kirov class are using a nuclear power plant. A nuclear power plant will give these destroyers an endless reach, only curbed by the endurance of the crew. One can question however how wise it is to place a nuclear power plant on board of a surface warship who in the event of a conflict will be in the forefront of the fight.

Conclusion

The Russian Navy is in need of a modernisation but how and when has always been a subject to much speculation, even within the Russian Navy itself.

Nevertheless is Russia eager to build a navy capable of operating on the world oceans and for that it needs destroyers. During 2015 the design of the new Leader-class destroyers will be finished and construction of these new destroyers will begin after 2020. Only twelve ships are currently reported to be constructed but it is possible that this number will go up to possibly 16.

Details remain vague for weapon systems and propulsion to be installed. We can however say to a fair degree that these ships will be better armed and more reliably powered than their predecessors of the Sovremennyy and Udaloy classes.

The young school maritime concept

Jeune école or young school was a 19^th century strategic maritime concept that originated in France. The basic theory behind this new maritime concept was the use of small but powerful naval units to fight off larger warships. At the same time the concept advocates an attack against enemy merchant shipping to break its economic power.

Although the 19^th century is far behind us, the ideas of the young school are still very useful and the concept still is implied by various smaller navies that seek to deter larger navies.

During the 1920s and 1930s it was the newly founded Soviet Union that revived and modernised the concept of young school. At the time the Soviet Navy lacked large surface ships and a renewed young school doctrine would call for the use in torpedo boats, destroyers, submarines, coastal defence and light cruisers whom were to raid the enemy’s sea lanes of communication.

All these naval units had a few things in common against the main naval warships of the surrounding countries. They were small, easy to construct and cheap compared to the heavy cruisers, battlecruisers and battleships of those days.

Fast Attack Craft form an integral part of the young school concept

At the same time the Soviet Navy described a set of rules for when a country should use this new young school doctrine:

1.       A New regime is under military and political attack and faced with unsuppressed domestic fighting. An army first policy is undertaken.

2.       The regime expects to be besieged and attacked (by amphibious forces).

3.       The countries navy is in disarray.

4.       The navy faces severe budgetary shortages (and can’t afford to build expensive warships).

5.       The country lacks the industry to produce modern naval armaments.

6.       The maritime frontier is hemmed in by adversarial fleets and bases.

Young school in a modern world

Knowing what young school is, what naval units it requires and under what circumstances a country decides to employ it we can see that the young school is still being used by several countries. Each one of them can easily be categorised under one or several points of the above list.

Most notably would be Iran who uses its fleet of fast attack craft to counter the bigger US Navy warships. Iran is strategically confronted with Points 2, 4, 5 and 6. Located at the Persian Gulf the country is hemmed in by US Navy forces with several US bases inside and outside the Persian Gulf. Economic sanctions on Iran prevent the country on making technologic advancements or building large warships.

China has until two decades ago also employed the young school concept by giving priority to its army to secure the communist revolution. It also lacked a large navy as well as the industry of building one. At the same time it feared the US 7^th Fleet  operating freely in front of the Chinese coast.

Likewise is the case of North Korea that employs midget submarines for coastal defense as well as offense as demonstrated by the sinking of the South Korean frigate ROKS Cheonan on 26 March 2010.

So even though the young school concept is old, it is still alive and well in the modern day and proving that it is an effective strategic maritime concept.

The combined naval strength of Sweden and Finland

Earlier this week both Sweden and Finland agreed to cooperate together on a military level. Central in this cooperation is the creation of a joint naval task force and mutual access to each other’s naval bases. Aside from the Russian navy, the Swedish navy is already the most powerful in the Baltic Sea and yet, by teaming up with the Finnish navy it would further strengthen the Swedish navy as well as the Finnish.

 

The Baltic Defence blog made a more detailed overview of how the strength of both the Swedish and Finnish navies will evolve in the next decade as well as a discription of the strategic and tactical implications of this joint naval cooperation.

 

The article can be read at:
The combined naval strength of Sweden and Finland

Improvements on China's Type 093 nuclear submarines

Over the past years the Chinese Navy (PLAN) underwent a major change. As the Chinese economy rose, so did China’s standing in the world. In order to project China’s new power across the region the PLAN made a transition from a coastal defence force into a powerful navy. At the moment the PLAN is a green water navy centred around diesel-electric submarines, corvettes and frigates. The primary goal of the PLAN is to gain naval superiority within the First Island Chain, a line running from Japan over Taiwan and the Philippines towards Singapore.

 

As China keeps becoming a more important player on the global stage it finds the need to project its power and influence beyond the First Island Chain. In order to accomplish that China needs a blue water navy with a true global reach. The PLAN already made the first steps in this new transition. Aircraft carriers, a new cruiser design and destroyers are a part of the blue water navy that China needs. Now the PLAN made improvements in a field it ignored for a long time, its Type 093 Shang class nuclear attack submarines (SSN).

 

The SSNs that the PLAN operates are old and outdated. They are reported to be loud and noisy and are thus easy detected by other modern navies. The Type 093 Shang class is reported to have similar capabilities as Soviet Victor III class submarines. Still, these submarines are the only tools the PLAN can employ at the moment to project power on a global scale. Although China plans to build new modern nuclear attack submarines these projects are still far away from completion. The PLAN thus upgraded its existing Type 093 SSNs to increase its combat capabilities.

Type 093 Shang class submarine before modernisation

The upgrades done to the Type 093 SSNs focused on the instalment of a vertical launch systems as well as the capability to fire the YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles. The instalment of a vertical launch system on board of the Type 093 gives the PLAN the same capabilities as US Navy Los Angeles class submarines. In general, the new Type 093 SSNs are now comparable to the Los Angeles class submarines of the 1980s.

 

Aside from being an anti-ship missile, the YJ-18 is also capable of attacking land targets, making it an equivalent to the US Tomahawk missile.

 

The implications of these new submarines are important to notice. The PLAN now has a platform capable to station weapons everywhere around the globe. Given the fact that China is an assertive player on the world scale it is very likely that it will deploy these Type 093 on patrols in the areas it deemed vital to project force. China’s main areas of interests are the East and South China Seas but its green water navy assets are more than capable to project power in these areas. Beyond this area China needs to be able to project power further in the Pacific Ocean to confront the US Navy.

 

A second area where these new submarines will be deployed is the Indian Ocean. PLAN nuclear submarines already patrolled this area last year. China has several economic projects in Africa and relies on oil from the Middle East to support its economy. China has made trade agreements with several nations that are not liked by Western nations. This made sense as these countries had resources but were unable to trade them on western markets, an opening that China was happy to exploit.

 

China will at some point in time find the need to deploy military power in order to safeguard its economic projects. The new Type 093 SSNs will be in the forefront, capable and ready to intervene when the need arises, similar to how US Navy Los Angeles SSN supported US interventions in the past