The Russian Navy has set for itself a very ambitious
plan to rebuild its naval forces and become once again a decent blue water
navy. The only problem is that Russia has these plans a lot and even after 15
years it still finds itself without a decent navy. Hampered by a weak economy,
several priorities, expensive technology, a lack of knowledge and a decent
maritime defence industry it will be hard for Russia to change the tide in the
next years.
As we stated earlier, Russia aims for the 2050
deadline to have its new fleet but it faces a large gap in the next years. As
the life expectancy of its soviet build warships are ending it seems that
Russia must find the means to rebuild its naval forces to bridge the 2020-2050
gap or face the prospect of several years without a blue water navy to rely on.
Modernisation of older ships
Russia has problems with keeping enough large
surface combatants active. It indeed had to resort to modernizing decommissioned
Kirov class cruisers to maintain a decent force of large warships afloat. More
problematic is the situation in the Russian submarine forces. Depending on the
numbers and analysis it is estimated that between 40 to 70% of all nuclear
submarines in the Russian Navy are not operational. Since most of these ships
were outdated models that were left over from the Soviet Union it is debatable
if they possess any real combat power.
Russia had plans to modernize its submarine
fleet by 2020 but delays were encountered in the construction of the
Borei-class SSBN and the Yasen-class SSN. These delays were mostly financial in
reason. Still, these delays mean that by 2020 Russia will not have its full
complement of modern submarines and thus will have to rely longer on it soviet
submarines. A new plan has recently emerged to modernise up to 10 nuclear
submarines of the Akula- and Oscar II-class. This modernisation plan will
extend their lifespan with 15 to 20 years making their projected end-life last
between 2030 and 2035. Modernizing 10 submarines is aimed to counter the gap
created by the slow construction of the Yasen-class SSN as only three to four
submarines out of the projected eight will be ready in 2020.
Indeed, Russia’s naval program is very
ambitious and even neglects its economic and technologic deficiencies. It is
estimated that between 50 and 70% of the weapons and equipment envisioned for
2020 will not be ready. This forces Russia to keep modernizing its already
aging and worn out fleet of Soviet era ships to keep its Navy up to strength.
Impossible carrier ambitions?
Russia has always stated that it wants aircraft
carrier. The exact amount was always debatable, depending on the defence
budgets. A fair assessment would be that Russia wants to operate 4 to 6
aircraft carrier by 2050, spread equally between the Northern and Pacific
Fleets.
A couple months ago a design of a new Russian
aircraft carrier was unveiled in Saint Petersburg. Nuclear powered, carrying
100 aircraft and with a ski ramp and catapults, the ship was unlike anything
seen so far. This was just an early design and there can happen a lot between
the first scale model and the carrier that will eventually be build. We must
however focus on how realistic a 100.000 ton carrier is for Russia.
During the Soviet Union it was the shipyard “Nikolayev
444” in Ukraine that built the aircraft carriers. Russia no longer has access
to this shipyard with the brake up of the Soviet Union. Even if it had the
Nikolayev 444 shipyard it would still not be enough as even that shipyard wasn’t
built to construct 100.000 ton aircraft carriers. Indeed, no shipyard in Russia
can build such an aircraft carrier. The only possibility would be to build it
in two segments and weld them together in the deep water basin at Sevmash in
northern Russia. But a better option would be the construction of a new large dry
dock but this goes beyond Russia’s current defence budget. Russia also never
had experience in building this type of aircraft carrier and there is doubt if
she could do it on her own. An earlier deal with France regarding the purchase
of the Mistral class ships was also aimed in bringing modern shipbuilding technology
to Russia. China seems a likely partner as the country has ambitions to build
its own nuclear powered aircraft carrier. Still, even if Russia would find the
skills and means to build an aircraft carrier it would take 10 to 15 years
before they get it operational.
Own developments
Russia isn’t incapable of building warships and
it has experience, just not in building large warships. Russia’s newest
generation of corvettes and frigates are of a good quality but they serve only
as a green water navy and lack the means to project power globally.
Russia does have the ambitions to build its
navy and new projects are beginning to take shape that air aimed to build
larger surface combatants. A new class of destroyers, the “Leader” class is
currently on the drawing board. Destroyers will be the backbone of any blue
water navy and Russia will need them in combination of its carrier ambitions.
Russia’s new aircraft carrier is designed to
project power, unlike the previous carriers that were only designed to protect
the own task force. A power projecting aircraft carrier lacks the means to
protect itself, in spite of its large arsenal of aircraft. This is why aircraft
carriers always travel with an escort, usually made up by destroyers armed with
a lot of missiles. If Russia wants to project power globally and is serious in
its carrier program then it will need a substantial amount of destroyers in its
arsenal.
Russia also hasn’t given up on the
Mistral-class. Plans are under way to build a copy of the Mistral-class in
Russia. The construction of a Russian version will most likely be taken place
in the Baltic shipyards according to the latest media statements. Once again
the deadline of 2020 is envisioned. Once again it should be noted that Russia
lacks the expertise to build these warships on their own but this doesn’t deter
them. It is possible they manage to build some variant on the Mistral-class but
the question will remain how good the vessel will be. Still, Russia needs to
learn how to build large surface combatants and has to start somewhere.
Outside pressure
Reality starts to face the Russian Navy. Most
of its current fleet is old and nearing the end of its surface life. The
current ship building plans are aimed at 2020. It is estimated that by then
most of the Soviet era warships are no longer functional. A full recovery for
the Russian Navy still remains for 2050.
Can Russia afford itself to scale back its ambitious
shipbuilding program and invest first in its defence industry? The answer is
no. Russia feels the need to stay involved in the world and the best thing to
do that is by having the tools to project power. The 21ste century will most
likely be a maritime one and Russia can not afford itself to be left over with
a fleet of corvettes, frigates and diesel-electric submarines that are most
suited for coastal defence. It needs powerful warships capable of operating a
long way from home.
Already Russia is feeling the pressure of
outside nations. China and the United States are building up their naval forces
in the Pacific. Russia already feels the need to strengthen its fleet in the
Pacific in order to maintain its influence or faces the prospect to be bypassed
by smaller nations like Japan and South-Korea.
Likewise it needs to be able to defend the
Black Sea and maintain its naval presence in the Mediterranean. A smaller
Russian navy can not be active everywhere.
Conclusion
The Russian navy finds itself at the cross
roads. It needs to have a decent navy, capable of operating globally and
compete with other naval powers. There are however lots of doubts if Russia can
make it. The plans for 2020 are very ambitious and might even fall short. This
will be true in the field of nuclear submarines. The Yasen-class SSN will only consist
of four boats by 2020 instead of eight fully operational in the planning. This
means Russia needs to fall back on its Soviet-era submarines but their combat
power and relevance remains questionable.
In the field of surface warships Russia needs
to learn how to build ships bigger than a frigate. The “Leader” class destroyer
and a Russian version of the Mistral are good initiatives to learn how to build
large warships. This experience will be needed once Russia starts building
nuclear powered aircraft carriers but without a decent dockyard the whole
carrier program seems difficult and troublesome to realize.
